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The dairy industry in Canada was turned on its ear by the release of the WTO decision last fall
that Canada’s Special Milk Classes constitute an export subsidy.  Dairy processors fear the loss
of established export markets.  At the same time, the decision threatens the role of supply
management authorities as the sole marketers of farmers’ milk.  Will farmers market milk for
export directly to processors?  What consequences could renewed marketing board involvement
in exports have in the international trade arena?  The industry is preparing for conflict as it
reorients itself in the international market.  That conflict is embedded in proposals made by some
of the milk marketing agencies and by some processor members of the National Dairy Council
(NDCC).
Because of the immediate importance of this case and the issues it spawns, the George Morris
Centre is releasing this special report.  It addresses the following topics:
• The nature of the challenges to the Special Milk Classes scheme
• The WTO decision
• Implications for the dairy industry
• Marketing boards’ proposal for export pricing reform  
• NDCC proposal for export pricing reform
• Evaluation of the alternatives
Challenges to Canada’s Export Milk Pricing System
In late 1997, the United States and New Zealand initiated a challenge of Canada’s milk
classification scheme before the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Board
(DSB).  The US and New Zealand claimed that the Special Milk Classes scheme operated by the
Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) and provincial marketing boards had sufficient involvement
by federal and provincial governments to constitute “government action” under the 1994
Agreement on Agriculture.  The US and New Zealand also claimed that under the Canadian milk
pricing scheme, classes 5(d) and 5(e) used to price milk for the export market constituted an
export subsidy.  
Specifically, the US and New Zealand claimed that classes 5(d) and (e) embody a “payment-in-
kind” to processors in the form of below cost milk, and that class 5 (d) and (e) milk is priced to
processors at a lower price than any alternative sources, satisfying the definition of an export
subsidy under Article 9.1(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture.  The US and New Zealand also
alleged that milk sold under classes 5(d) and 5(e) constituted a payment in kind financed by
virtue of government action, and thus an export subsidy under Article 9.1(c).  Pursuant to the
claims that the Special Milk Classes scheme was an export subsidy, the US and New Zealand
claimed that Canada had violated provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture relating to the use2
of export subsidies.  The complainants argued that through the Special Milk Classes scheme,
• Canada exceeded permitted levels of subsidized exports (contrary to Article 3.3),
• Canada exceeded subsidized exports on cheese, butter, and other dairy products
(contrary to Article 10.1), 
• Canada undertook new export subsidies (contrary to Article 8).
The essential economic content of the challenge relates to pooling of milk over domestic and
export milk classes.  The complainants identified the Special Milk Classes scheme as an implicit
export subsidy because it uses revenue from higher valued domestic milk classes (Class 1-4) as a
means to subsidize below-cost sales of milk to the export market (Class 5 (d) and (e)) through
class pooling.  Because the higher priced domestic market is maintained through the regulatory
actions of federal and provincial supply management agencies, the Americans and Kiwis alleged
that the implicit export subsidy was illegal.        
The WTO Decisions
The initial decision on the export subsidy case was released by the DSB in May, 1999.  The DSB
found that Canada was unable to meet its burden of proof in demonstrating that the Import for
Re-export program provided milk for export on equivalent terms as Class 5 (d) and (e).  They
also found that CDC product sales through Class 5 conferred a guaranteed margin to processors. 
As such, the DSB found that the Special Milk Classes scheme satisfied the definition of an
export subsidy under Article 9.1(a).  Because the CDC and provincial marketing boards were
either direct government agencies or were under the direct supervision of a government
regulatory body, the DSB found that the Special Milk Classes scheme was an export subsidy as
defined under Article 9.1(c).  With the finding that Class 5(d) and (e) pricing constitutes an
export subsidy, the DSB sided with the complainants on their arguments stemming from illegal
uses of export subsidies.
Canada appealed the decision in Summer 1999 on the grounds that the DSB was unjustified in
declaring the payment-in-kind an export subsidy, and that marketing boards were incorrectly
identified as government agencies.  In its final decision in October, 1999, the WTO appellate
body overturned the previous ruling that the payment-in-kind constitutes a subsidy under Article
9.1(a).  However, the appellate body upheld the remaining findings that had been appealed by
Canada, including the findings that the CDC and provincial marketing boards are government
agencies, and that Special Classes 5(d) and (e) are financed by virtue of government action.  It
reinterpreted Article 9.1(c) as including payments-in-kind.  As a result of this decision, Canada
agreed to bring the export milk pricing system into compliance by August 1/2000, with all
required legislative changes to be implemented by December 31, 2000.1Yogurt (not shown in Figure 2) is also a growing market for the Canadian dairy industry
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Implications For the Dairy Industry
The WTO decision has a number of implications for the dairy industry:
• The most immediate impact is a reduction in milk available to processors for
export through Class 5(d) and (e).  As a consequence of the WTO decision,
Canada faces a steep reduction in the volume of cheese, butter, skim milk powder,
and other products that can be exported through the existing system.  The gravity
of the situation is illustrated in the Table 1 below which shows Canada’s
committed levels of subsidized exports and actual dairy product exports.  Under
the current marketing system, future exports would have to comply with the WTO
mandated levels, which would be a harsh adjustment, particularly in the cheese
and other products categories.
   
• In turn, this means that Canadian dairy processors will be unable to supply export
markets that they have in recent years.  Exports are of increasing importance to the
Canadian dairy industry. Figure 1 below shows that since the Agreement on
Agriculture was concluded in 1994, Canadian dairy processors have been
successful in expanding export markets for higher valued dairy products.  In
particular, exports of cheddar and specialty cheeses have grown steadily, while the 
lower valued butter and processed cheese categories have been relatively flat. 
These exports are in addition to the SMP exports that control the structural
surplus in Canada.
• Apart from Italian and specialty cheeses
1, the Canadian market for processed dairy
products is largely mature and bottled milk has been yielding market share to soft
drinks in the beverage market for years.  Figure 2 below illustrates this- variety
cheese is about the only manufactured product showing significant increases in
domestic disappearance.  Thus, the export market provides the dairy industry with
a very important source of growth given that domestic demand is stagnant.
• On the other hand, because of Canada’s minimum access commitments for dairy
products (negotiated in the Uruguay Round and in bilateral trade agreements),
dairy product imports will penetrate the Canadian market to an increasing extent
in the future. So, while the dispute decision means that exports will decline, the
minimum access commitments mean imports will increase if there is not a pro-
active response to the decision.
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Table 1
Committed Subsidized Export Levels and Actual Exports, 1995/96 - 2000/01 (thousand kg)













































































* Dairy year August1- July 31
** Source: 1994 Agreement on Agriculture, WTO
*** Source: Statistics Canada5
Figure 1
Canadian Exports of Selected Dairy Products, 1994/95-1998/99*
Source: Statistics Canada
* Dairy Year August 1- July 31
• The import effects may be intensified if Canadian tariffs decrease and imports
made from much lower cost milk increase as a result of a new WTO Round. 
Canadian processors will feel intense pressure in the domestic market; unless
Canadian processors are successful in establishing export markets abroad, this
pressure from imports into the domestic market will shrink the dairy industry.
Pressures on processors mean dairy farmers will inevitably be impacted by the WTO decision. 
Milk production has been increasing steadily over the last number of years; between 1995 and
1999 Canadian milk production increased about 4%.  This increase has been fuelled by generally
positive profitability conditions for farmers.  The best indication of this is milk quota values,
which have increased sharply.  Milk production and quota price increases are largely the result of
the fact that farmers have a market for their milk. Table 2 below shows that the Special Milk 6
Figure 2  Domestic Disappearance of Dairy Products, 1980/81 - 1998/99*
Source: Statistics Canada
*Dairy Year August 1- July 31
Classes scheme (Class 5) has been an important part of that market.  In particular, the export
classes 5 (d) and (e) are the majority of the milk in the special class.  Farmers will not be happy if 
Table 2  Percentage of Milk Marketed in Special Classes in Canada, by Dairy Year




Simple Average 14.5% 9.8%
Source: Canadian Dairy Information Centre
*August-November7
they lose much of the almost 10% of their market which goes to exports.
However, the WTO did not say that Canada is not allowed to ship milk for export; it only said
that the CDC and provincial marketing boards could not do it on farmers’ behalf.  The WTO
found that these supply management authorities are “government agencies”, and that by using
Special Classes 5(d) and (e) “exports are financed by virtue of government action”.  In fact, the
implication of the ruling is two-fold.  Firstly, the provision of export milk to processors at
discount prices financed through pooling or other means coordinated by government action
constitutes an export subsidy.  Secondly, a government agency (marketing board) cannot
determine export levels or otherwise direct milk to export.  
This second implication of the WTO ruling has profound consequences for the CDC and
provincial marketing boards.  For almost 30 years, the CDC held the mandate to plan industrial
milk marketing and marketing boards have been the monopoly purchasers of farmers’ milk.  This
role in milk marketing is entrenched in provincial legislation and in the Canadian Dairy
Commission Act.  However, according to the WTO decision, if dairy exports occur through the
Canadian Dairy Commission or provincial boards, they are subsidized exports that face the limits
negotiated in the Uruguay Round.  If this were to happen, Canada would fill its limit of
subsidized exports quite quickly; dairy exports would fall drastically.
This brings into question an institution that has long remained sacred- the exclusivity of
marketing boards as the sole purchasers of farmers’ milk.  Continued involvement of the CDC
and marketing boards in export sales would result in fewer exports because of the WTO limits on
subsidized exports.  The consequence would be greater difficulty for processors in sourcing milk
used in products destined for export and a loss of markets for farmers’ milk.  But what if farmers
sold milk directly to processors, without CDC/marketing board involvement?  If this were to
occur, it would circumvent the WTO difficulties in marketing milk for export.  No one could
claim that export levels or financing occurred “by virtue of government action”, or that the
pooling of an export milk class with the domestic classes comprises an export subsidy.  What’s
more, there would be no supply management on the export milk.  This would be of substantial
benefit to farmers wishing to expand but concerned about high quota costs, and would provide
expanding volumes of milk to processors for export products.  However, this all works against 30
years of tradition and layers of legislation establishing the absolute authority of marketing boards
in Canadian milk marketing.
Marketing Boards’ Proposal for Export Pricing Reform
Marketing boards are justifiably concerned about the situation.  Export marketing allows them to
maintain the stable domestic marketing conditions touted as one of the primary benefits of supply
management.  Losing control over export marketing, it is claimed, would make it more difficult
to control the milk supply because the “sleeve” (discretionary milk quantity) would be lost. 
There is also an important precedent at stake; if marketing boards lose control over some of the
milk supply, is it possible they might lose more control in the future?  These concerns are surely2 Speech by Kempton Matte, NDCC President and CEO, Dairy Farmers of Canada
Annual Policy Conference, January 25, 2000 
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weighing on marketing board leaders.
Milk marketing boards wish to retain involvement in export milk marketing.  The proposal for
export pricing reform forwarded by the marketing boards involves processors submitting bids
and farmers submitting offers to a bulletin board operated by the marketing board.  The
marketing board would put buyers in touch with sellers by performing a brokerage function. 
Milk for export would thus be sold on contracts negotiated between farmers and processors.  The
milk sold through this process would be the “first out of the tank”- farmers would not be able to
export residual milk after quota has been filled.  Quota volume would be filled after contractual
sales have been made.  The milk sold on contract would face standard licensing and
transportation levies; the promotion levy would not be charged.
NDCC Members’ Proposals
Members of the National Dairy Council of Canada (NDCC) also have an important stake in
export milk pricing.  The NDCC represents dairy processors, many of whom serve export
markets.  What’s at stake for the processors is the possible loss of export markets if subsidized
exports are brought back in line with Uruguay Round commitments.  The NDCC does not
believe the loss of export markets is an option for the dairy industry
2.
In an attempt to retain and expand dairy export markets, the NDCC members have proposed an
alternative system for facilitating dairy exports.  The NDCC favours export milk pricing reform
that would be decentralized from marketing board control.  Under their proposal, milk would be
procured directly from farmers by processors through contracts.  Like the marketing boards’
proposal, the contracted milk would be the first out of the tank.  All milk and components would
be exported, subject to the same audit and reporting procedures as domestic milk.
Export Milk Pricing Alternatives: An Evaluation
Who should handle milk for export?  The answer to this question hinges critically on two
questions: (1) does the “brokerage” function of the bulletin board scheme proposed by marketing
boards confer a benefit (i.e. is it an export subsidy), and (2) will the milk utilization audit and
reporting system be sufficient to keep domestic and export markets segregated?  
The marketing boards are counting on the bulletin board scheme not being counted as conferring
any benefit (export subsidy).  If marketing board coordination of exports is declared an export
subsidy, dairy product exports will be forced to conform with agreed upon limits which are much
lower than recent export levels, and dairy farmers will lose a significant market for their milk.  In
the coming debate, the marketing boards will likely argue that the domestic and export markets
cannot be maintained as separate unless marketing boards coordinate because the reporting
system cannot guarantee segregation of domestic milk from export milk; this would undermine3“New Dairy War Looms With US Industry”, National Post, February 4, 2000  
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the supply management system in the domestic market.  
If processors purchase milk directly from farmers, as the NDCC members advocate, there is no
fear of the system being declared an export subsidy.  The implication is that there would be no
supply management on export milk, because there is no WTO cap on unsubsidized dairy product
exports.  This would allow processors to retain and expand export markets and source export
milk much more easily.  It would also provide producers with a market for which no quota is
required- at a time when prohibitively high quota prices (as much as $20,000 per cow) are a big
issue for many producers.  The onus would be placed on processors to handle milk for export in
such a way that they can prove it is not infiltrating the domestic market.  Direct movement of
export milk would place additional pressure on the supply management system domestically
through the loss of the “sleeve” to account for unanticipated market conditions.
So what are the chances that the brokerage function performed by marketing boards would be
declared an export subsidy?  Probably pretty good, when you consider that all that has to be
shown is that there is a benefit conferred by it.  Brokers in many other commodities make a very
good living, so it only stands to reason that it has value.  Marketing boards have unique access to
all the dairy producers in a province, so the brokerage service they provide to a processor would
be particularly good, compared to the cost that would be incurred by the processor to perform its
own procurement function.  Initial indications from US trade officials and an American dairy
processors’ organization are that there would be objections to marketing board involvement;
even Canadian trade officials say that board-run price mechanisms would not be defensible
3.    
                
And what of the reporting system for milk utilization, is it up to it?  The system currently reports
utilization of 16 different milk classes, 14 of which are domestic.  Processors are responsible for
component testing and reporting utilization of milk in these classes, on both a hectolitre and a
component basis, and are subject to periodic audit.  It is difficult to believe that if procurement of
producer milk for export were given to processors, this system would necessarily break down and
lead to export milk in the domestic market.  In fact, there would be one less class of milk to
report  if processors procured directly.  And, the only real difference in the two proposals is that
in one, the pricing function would be direct between a processor and a farm, while in the other it
would be between the Board and a farmer.  After that, both require documentation and audit.  If
one system can be audited, so can the other.
Implications
If you come to the conclusion that marketing board involvement in export sales of milk confers a
benefit, and that it would be possible to maintain separate domestic and export markets for milk
without marketing board involvement in exports, then the best option for the dairy industry is to
allow processors to procure export milk directly from farmers.  The alternative is a loss of export10
markets- virtually the only growing market Canada has- which will hurt dairy processors and
dairy farmers.  This seems like a big sacrifice to make to protect the marketing board hegemony. 
  
 